

# OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

## December 2012



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This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of December 2012.

Editor: Masahiro Akiyama

Staff writers:

Kazumine Akimoto, Masami Kawamura, Wakana Mukai, Satoru Nagao, Eiji Sakai,  
Daisuke Sekine, Yuko Takada, Takehisa Tomomori, Hideshi Ueno, Daiju Wada

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# Information Digest of December 2012

## 1. Maritime Security

### December 1 “Somali Pirates Released Korean Crews” (gCaptain, Reuters, December 3, 2012)

South Korea’s Foreign Ministry revealed that 4 South Korean sailors boarding on the chemical tanker MT *Gemini*, who were abducted by Somali pirates on the 30th April 2011 during their navigation from Kenya to Malaysia, were released on the 1st. The tanker operated by Singapore-based Glory Ship Management was already released with the other 21 non-Korean crews on November 30, 2011. But it is uncertain whether a ransom was paid.

Refer to the article: Somali Pirates Free Four Hostages After 19 Months in Captivity  
<http://gcaptain.com/somali-pirates-release-four-south-korean-hostages/>

### December 4 “Kenya demands ships carrying armed guards for an application in advance” (Shiptalk, December 4, 2012)

According to Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA), new guidelines prohibit ships carrying arms or armed guards to sail in Kenya’s territorial waters, if a flag state does not apply for a document to ask for permission in advance. KMA wants flag states to regulate the selection and use of private armed security guards to ensure high ethnic standards and professionalism. The guidelines also require flag states to submit such documents on every sailing in the waters.

Refer to the article: Kenya On Armed Guards  
<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=13435>

### December 10, “PMPF failed to rescue crews of MV *Iceberg 1* (Garowe Online, December 11, 2012)

On the night of the 10th, Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) in Somalia conducted a rescue operation for crews which are taken hostages mostly for 3 years on the MV *Icebergs*. After failed rescue attempt, PMPF found pirates carrying arms and ammunitions into the vessel, and killed 3 and arrested 3 on the 11th. PMPF blockaded the MV *Icebergs* being held by pirates in Puntland waters and the vessel owned by a shipping company headquartered in Dubai was hijacked on March 29, 2010, about 10 nautical miles off the coast of Aden, Yemen. After hijacked, the company renounced the vessel but one of all the 24 crews committed a suicide in October 2010, diving to the sea, and another (it was likely the captain) was said to have been killed by pirates. Sources close to PMPF told that the force was negotiating with the pirates to release the crews for a long time till the rescue operation and has been continuously calling pirates to surrender, blockading the vessel.

Refer to the article: Somalia: Puntland forces kill 3 pirates in hostage rescue attempt

[http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia\\_27/Somalia\\_Puntland\\_forces\\_kill\\_3\\_pirates\\_in\\_hostage\\_rescue\\_attempt.shtml](http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Puntland_forces_kill_3_pirates_in_hostage_rescue_attempt.shtml)

**【Related article】**

**“Somali pirates release crew of MV *Iceberg 1*” (gCaptain, December 23, 2012)**

Somali pirates have released 22 hostages held aboard *the M/V Iceberg 1*, according to a statement dated 23rd by officials in Somali’s semiautonomous region of Puntland. “After 2 years and 9 months in captivity, the hostages have suffered signs of physical torture and illness. The hostages are now receiving nutrition and medical care,” the statement said. It is unclear if any ransom was paid for the hostage’s release.

Refer to the article: Somali Pirates Release Crew of ‘Iceberg 1’

<http://gcaptain.com/crew-of-iceberg-1-freed-by-somali-pirates/>



A recent picture taken of the MV *Iceberg 1*. This Panamanian-flagged RoRo vessel is the longest-held vessel by Somali pirates.


Source: gCaptain, December 23, 2012

**December 11 “China’s biggest fishery vessel goes takes office” (CCTV.com, December 11, 2012)**

On the 11th, the ceremony for China’s biggest fishery vessel “*China Yuzheng 206*” was held in Shanghai. The vessel which weighs 5,800 tons will undertake marine law enforcement patrol missions in the East China Sea.

Refer to the article: China's biggest fishery vessel "China Yuzheng 206" makes maiden voyage

<http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20121211/105245.shtml>



*China Yuzheng 206*

Source: CCTV.com, December 11, 2012

### **December 13, “India decided to strengthen its coastal security” (Defense News, December.14, 2012)**

On the 13th, the Indian’s Cabinet Committee on Security, the highest body in the government responsible for national security and defense, decided a \$390 million proposal to upgrade the country’s coastal security, which involves buying additional patrol vessels and improving the radar network. According to the plan, the Indian Coast Guard acquires five offshore patrol vessels and new coastal radars will be installed in 38 different places by \$116.3 million. In all, the Coastal Surveillance Network will be operational by mid-2013 with existing radars in 40 different places. The Coastal Surveillance Network consists of a chain of static radar and electro-optic sensors at 84 remote sites along the coast, including the island territories, to detect movement of suspicious vessels. The placement of coastal radars is part of India’s plans to improve its maritime security agency, having learned from the lesson of the Mumbai terror attacks on November 26, 2010. The Coast Guard is also acquiring 20 fast patrol vehicles, 41 interceptor boats, 12 coastal surveillance aircraft (Dornier), and seven off-shore patrol vehicles.

Refer to the article: India Funds Coastal Security Upgrades

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121214/DEFREG03/312140010/India-Funds-Coastal-Security-Upgrades>

### **【Related article】**

### **“Indian Coast Guard opens a station in the North Andaman Islands” (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, December 24, 2012)**

Indian Coast Guard opened its first station in the North Andaman Islands on the 24th. This station is a part of efforts by the coast guard to strengthen maritime and coastal security there.

Refer to the article: Commissioning of ICGS Mayabunder

<http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=91153>

### **December 15 “Somali pirates attacked a vessel just before armed guards embark” (Shiptalk, December 18, 2012)**

If pirates know that its targeting vessel is going to a port to embark armed guards, they may attack this vessel before the guard board on it. On the 15th, it seems that this could be exactly what happened to the vessel, MV *Torm Kristina* which was attacked by suspected pirates. Under a performance named “a quick logistical port visit”, the vessel was attacked by 2 small boats boarding pirates during its sailing to Muscat, Oman before arriving to the port. The crews evacuated to the citadel and sent a mayday message out. Fortunately, a NATO warship was within relatively close reach, and was dispatched to the MV *Torn Kristina* to assist. 3 hours later, the NATO warship arrived but the pirates had left the vessel. When attacked by the pirates, the vessel was sailing from the Persian Gulf to Tuban, Java and no armed guards were on board even though there was a plan to embark. The place remains unclear and it seems likely to have been the reason for the logistical port visit.

Refer to the article: Pirates Hit Ship Before Guards Embarked

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=13529>

#### **【Related article】**

### **“NATO’s warning: Somali PAGs’ recent tactics “soft-approaches”” (NATO Shipping Centre, December 29, 2012)**

Recently, NATO warned that Somali PAGs (Pirates Action Group) have been making “soft-approaches.” Accordingly, a skiff will often approach a vessel to probe the reactivity of its embarked security team (if present). If they elicit no response, the pirates may then proceed with an attack, sometimes accompanied by a second skiff. This practice seems designed to let pirates avoid needless expenditures of ammunition and personal risk without a significant probability of success. Meanwhile, a large number of fishing vessels also operate in the South Red Sea, the Bab-Al-Mandeb and up to 50 nm off the west coast of India. Fishing vessels may approach a merchant ship to maximize fishing opportunities or to safeguard fishing nets. Fishing off India is generally carried out using long lines by mechanized or single-hull boats which typically have outboard motors and carry 4-6 crew members. Masters are requested to ensure that they distinguish between fishing vessels and potential pirates; fishermen may carry small arms.

Refer to the article: Daily Piracy Update

<http://www.shipping.nato.int/operations/OS/Pages/DailyPiracyUpdate.aspx>

### **December 15 “EU Naval Force apprehends five suspected pirates” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, December 17, 2012)**

In the afternoon of the 15th, the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Belgian frigate BNS *Louise-Marie* intercepted one skiff with five suspected pirates on board. While underway to the probable pirates’ operating area, the Swedish EU NAVFOR maritime patrol aircraft (MPRA) was able to locate the suspicious skiff on the 12th. On the 15th, the MPRA was able to relocate the suspicious skiff. Within 3 hours, BNS *Louise-Marie*’s helicopter was on scene, closely followed by

the frigate herself and her boarding team. The skiff, equipped with a ladder and a boarding hook, was taken on board the frigate. The five suspected pirates are being held on board BNS *Louise-Marie* for further investigation and evidence collection in order to fully assess the possibility of prosecution. Below is the scene at the time.

Refer to the article: EU Naval Force Belgian Frigate BNS *Louise-Marie* Apprehends Five Suspected Pirates

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2012/12/eu-naval-force-belgian-frigate-louise-marie-apprehends-five-suspected-pirates/>



Belgian EU Naval Force frigate BNS *Louise-Marie*'s boarding team approaching the suspected pirates

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, December 17, 2012

## 2. Military Developments

### December 1 “The U.S Navy’s first nuclear powered aircraft carrier came to its retirement” (gCaptain, December 1, 2012)

On the 1st, the US navy’s fleet USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65), which was the world’s first nuclear powered aircraft carrier, reached its retirement after missions for 51 years. Its name will be succeeded to the next *Ford* Class Carrier, CVN-80. The CVN 65 was engaged in the blockage operation at the time of Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, as its first mission in international crisis.

Refer to the article: After 1,000,000 Nautical Miles and 51 Years at Sea, USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65) is decommissioned

<http://gcaptain.com/1000000-nautical-miles-years/>

**December 1 “Joint Indo-Russian naval exercise off Mumbai coast” (Business Standard, December 1, 2012)**

On the 1st, the Indian and Russian navies declared that they would conduct a joint exercise named “Indra” off Mumbai coast on December 2nd and 3rd. While Indian navy’s destroyers *INS Mysore* and *INS Tabar* join that exercise, the participants from Russian navy are anti-submarine destroyer *Marshal Shaposhnikov*, replenishment oiler *IRKUT* and rescue tug *Alatau*.

Refer to the article: Joint Indo-Russian naval exercise off Mumbai coast

<http://www.business-standard.com/generalnews/news/joint-indo-russian-naval-exercise-off-mumbai-coast/86369/>

**December 3, “India ready to dispatch fleets to protect India’s interests in South China Sea” (The Indian Express, December 4, 2012)**

On the 3rd, the Indian navy’s chief Admiral D K Joshi revealed that they can be ready to send the naval forces, if necessary, to protect their undersea oil interests approved by Vietnam in South China Sea. Moreover, he commented that while we never expect South China Sea to be frequent by navy’s activities, we are prepared for military dispatch to protect our interests such as ONGC Videsh, if a contingency occurs. Joshi also expressed his view about rapid modernization of the Chinese military such as aircraft carriers, indicating that it takes time for its operational sophistication and India’s navy is aimed at improving military capabilities which can counter China’s aircraft carrier killer ballistic missiles.

Refer to the article: Ready to protect Indian interests in South China Sea: Navy Chief

<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ready-to-protect-indian-interests-in-south-china-sea-navy-chief/1040119/>

**December 5 “Military Sealift Command Accepts Delivery of First JHSV” (gCaptain, December 6, 2012)**

On the 5th, the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) accepted delivery of the first joint high-speed vessel (JHSV), USNS *Spearhead*, at Austal Shipyard in Alabama. 9 JHSVs are planned to be constructed and additionally the navy has also an option to build a tenth one. The 338-foot-long aluminum catamarans are designed to be fast, flexible and maneuverable, even in shallow waters, making them ideal for transporting troops and equipment quickly within a theater of operations. JHSVs that will be operated by 22 civil service mariners are capable of transporting approximately 600 tons of military troops, vehicles, supplies and equipment 1,200 nautical miles at an average speed of 35 knots. Additionally, the JHSV’s aviation flight deck is able to support 24 hours flight operations for many kinds of aircrafts such as CH-53 Super Stallions. These has sleeping accommodations for up to 42 crews, 104 personnel and airline-style seating for 312 persons.

Refer to the article: Military Sealift Command Accepts Delivery of First JHSV

<http://gcaptain.com/military-sealift-command-accepts/>





USNS *Spearhead*, pictured above at Austal USA, is the first of the Navy's joint high-speed vessels. The ship was delivered to the Navy on December. 5.

Source: gCaptain, December 6, 2012

### **December 9 “India strengthens its submarine force” (Examier.com, December 9, 2012)**

The Government of India approved \$10 billion in funding to strengthen and improve its naval undersea warfare capabilities. In this scheme, it is planned to construct next generation diesel-electric attack submarines to reinforce the existing forces which consist of 10 *Kilo* Class of Russian design; four modified German Type 209 Class and two nuclear powered *Akula* Class attack submarines leased from Russia. India is now constructing six *Scorpen* Class diesel-electric submarines which France and Spain designed, and will equip new type submarines which are larger than the *Scorpen* and air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems developed by Swedish naval engineers. With AIP system, it is possible to submerge for more than 3 weeks as stealthily as a nuclear submarine.

Refer to the article: India expanding submarine force to meet China threat

<http://www.examiner.com/article/india-expanding-submarine-force-to-meet-china-threat>

### **【Related article】**

#### **“Indian Navy: lease nuclear submarine from Russia facing problems with critical components” (The Times of India, December 24, 2012)**

According to a report from the Indian newspaper, *The Times of India* dated the 24th as a story from Indian Navy's sources, India's only Russian-origin nuclear submarine INS *Chakra* is facing problems with its critical components affecting its operational readiness. Russia has been asked to provide the parts for the vessel which need to be replaced. The Indian Navy's sources did not refer the questionable components in detail. India had inducted the *Akula-II* Class '*Nerpa*' nuclear submarine in its inventory in April 2012 at the Vishakhapatnam-based Eastern Naval Command. It was renamed INS *Chakra* by the Indian Navy. The Russian submarine had met with an accident in November 2008 and around twenty sailors were killed. The submarine was launched in 1993-94 but its construction was held up since then due to lack of funds with the

Russian Navy. However, in 2004, the Russian side decided to build it after reaching a ten-year lease agreement for operation of the submarine with the Indian side. With INS *Chakra* and the yet-to-be-inducted indigenously built INS *Arihant*, India is planning to have two nuclear submarines. With a maximum speed of 30 knots, INS *Chakra* can go to a depth of 600 meters and has an endurance of 100 days with a crew of 73. The vessel is armed with four 533mm and four 650mm torpedo tubes. However, it cannot carry nuclear warheads.

Refer to the article: Nuclear submarine INS Chakra facing problems with critical components: Navy

[http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-24/india/35990873\\_1\\_personnel-on-such-s-ubmarines-ins-chakra-ins-arihant](http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-24/india/35990873_1_personnel-on-such-s-ubmarines-ins-chakra-ins-arihant)

### **December 9 “India needs to raise the naval status in its strategic thought” (The Hindu, December 9, 2012)**

On the 9th, the Indian newspaper, *The Hindu*, carried an analytical article titled “Indian Navy needs a wider berth,” by Ninad D. Sheth, an Indian independent journalist. In the article, author insists that India needs to raise the naval status in its strategic thought. The gist of article is as follows.

- (1) According to the Indian Defense Ministry, the Indian Navy has added about 15 ships over the last 3 years including a nuclear submarine from Russia, the *Akulla II* class. Russian aircraft carrier the INS *Vikramaditya* will be delivered soon and other ships include 3 stealth frigates of the *Shivalik* class, resupply tankers and fast attack boats. Moreover, it is planned to acquire 5 ships every year for the next 5 years and the Navy improves its maritime surveillance capability by the acquisition of the US-made P-8I aircraft, armed with Harpoon missiles. These naval developments can restore Indian maritime primacy in the Indian Ocean waters. The imperial Navy which India inherited from the British controlled seas from Aden to Singapore and the sea control included an outreach capability over the three critical “chokepoints”— Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf, the straits south of Sri Lanka and the Malacca straits in the Singapore littoral.
- (2) The Indian Navy has also constructed 2 critical bases with an estimated cost of \$3 billion. The INS Dweep prakshak on the Lakshadweep Island, in the western coast, will handle surveillance and base larger war ships, and India can secure a stronger sea control capability. On the other hand, in the east coast, India opened a new naval air station, Baaz. This base will be controlled under the tri-command in the Campbell Bay, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and is situated nearer to the Malacca Strait than to India. These 2 bases are complemented by India’s longest runway at the INS Rajali in Tamil Nadu that will base the P81 spy aircraft. The Navy has also been digital with all ships in the process of being linked to a command and control apparatus. Not only the fact that nuclear submarines have an ability to stay in the sea without oil for a long time, it is virtually impossible to detect and those can have several nuclear weapons aboard depending on the configuration. What is more, the nuclear submarine can be far, really far, out at sea. The Navy is unique

in its ability to project power beyond the constraints of national boundaries, while the Army and the Air Force does not have such the advantage, and the submarines combined with the aircraft carrier battle group provides a critical edge for India. However, the Indian mindset is landlocked and the strategic planners need to reorient completely from brown and white lands and the Himalayas to the endless oceans. Moreover, the Navy will require two critical changes in India's way of war. One of the two is that India has to move away from prioritising the million-plus army and allocate bandwidth and funds for the Navy in strategy.

- (3) Second, the Defence Ministry and the Navy need to bring the myriad defense public sector under their control. Though Indian-made warships cost a quarter of similar class ships of the West and Japan, the time overruns are very high and the Navy has a staggering delayed delivery schedule. This constrains the force with only about six submarines at any given point at sea, and the Navy needs to allow private players in warship building. Some of the building has been already begun and the hull of Arihant, India's own nuclear submarine due for sea trials soon, was built by L&T, a private firm. Such participation accelerates if India allows majority investment from foreign players in shipbuilding and taps the potential of defense offsets. But partnership with foreign investment is the way forward. India's state-owned shipyards are in a growth dilemma — choked with orders they cannot fulfill for lack of technology and funds.
- (4) The ocean is too large to be anybody's playground, India share the maritime advantage with democratic countries, which all of them have strong navies, such as the US, Japan, Indonesia and Australia. Working with them will be an advantage for India. This will need diplomatic innovation and a strategic re-jig. Without it, floating assets, even hefty ones, will count for little.

Refer to the article: Indian Navy needs a wider berth

<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/indian-navy-needs-a-wider-berth/article4181397.ece>

### **【Related article】**

#### **“Indian Navy to set up naval base on east coast in 2013” (The Telegraph, December 5, 2012)**

The British newspaper, *The Telegraph* dated the 5th reported about a naval base on its east coast being built by India as follows.

- (1) The Indian Navy is set to partially commission a secretive new strategic base on its east coast in 2013 that will be the home port for its warships that sail to South East Asia, the South China Sea and the Pacific. Ramkonda or Rambilli, a quiet suburban settlement on Andhra's craggy coastline about 50km south of the Eastern Naval Command headquartered in Visakhapatnam, is set to become the navy's largest infrastructure base when it is finally completed. Spread over 20sqkm, it is called “Project Varsha”. It is on the scale of “Project Seabird” at Karwar on the west coast (in north Karnataka). Like “Seabird”

was designed to accommodate an aircraft carrier and de-congest Mumbai harbour, “Varsha” is said to have been conceived to unclog Vizag. Work on the project began in 2005 to de-congest Vizag port, where the naval dockyards and the submarine base have run out of space. “Varsha” would also be located close to a large facility of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC).

- (2) When work on Project Varsha began, the Eastern Naval Command had 15 major warships. Now it has 46, including the nuclear-powered INS *Chakra* leased from Russia. India’s homebuilt nuclear submarine, the INS *Arihant*, is also based in Vizag and is scheduled to go into trials in early 2013. Three more *Arihant*-class submarines were being built at the Shipbuilding Centre (SBC) in Vizag’s naval dockyards. Project Varsha has been designed to contain within it berthing facilities for warships and submarines in a dockyard among hills. The location was chosen because the depth of the water would allow for the vessels to berth easily. Varsha is easily the largest but by no means the only major naval project on the Bay of Bengal coast.

Refer to the article: Secret warship base comes up on east coast

[http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121205/jsp/nation/story\\_16276167.jsp#.UOVGFer1-hU](http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121205/jsp/nation/story_16276167.jsp#.UOVGFer1-hU)

### **December 11” The current trend and future for the U.S. Marine Corps – General James F. Amos” (The Diplomat, December 11, 2012)**

General James F. Amos, the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, told in the interview by Sergei Desilva-Ranasinghe, Visiting Fellow at the National Security Institute at the University of Canberra. Amos explained about the Corps’s transformation and modernization, the impact of successive deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the strategic realignment to the Asia-Pacific and the likely future battlefield. The following is the summary of this interview.

Q: How has the USMC transformed and modernized since 9/11?

A: As the U.S.’s expeditionary crisis response force, the Marine Corps has always responded as well as expected to the nation’s call. No two fights are the same. So, the Marine Corps has historically maintained a service culture of mental flexibility, adaptability, and operational agility. While we are in the process of transforming our force with capabilities optimized for forward-presence, engagement, and rapid crisis response, progressively, we have reshaped our internal organization to increase flexibility and unity across the range of military operations, and enhanced our support to U.S. Special Operations and Cyber Commands. Furthermore, as for modernization, in addition to the practical deployment of the MV-22 Osprey, the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and the establishment of our first operational F-35B squadron, we have upgraded our C-130s and UH and AH-1 helicopters, and are now leaning into upgrading our CH-53s with the K variant. We are developing the next variants of the America class Landing Helicopter Assault (LHAs) ships and have also captured the lessons of the last decade at war and incorporated them into our training and education programs.

Q: How do you respond to the perception among some commentators that the USMC has become essentially a land army due to extended deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan?

A: As the U.S.'s expeditionary crisis response force, we do all whatever our state orders, this is my answer. Therefore, though it is true that we had been involved in battles on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are proud of our missions there. While our army, navy and air force each have domains of warfare, we Marines have a lane — and that lane is crisis response. We respond rapidly so as to provide our leadership at the highest levels of government the time and space to make sound strategic decisions. That's what we do for America.

Q: How is the USMC adapting to the changing global strategic environment? How is the USMC reorienting to the Asia-Pacific and what will this mean for the region?

A: We have a long history in the Pacific with many hard-won victories and this region is a part of our institutional DNA. In fact, Naval amphibious forces are the most suitable to address emerging strategic needs in the Pacific. Today, we have about 16,000 Marines forward-deployed to Japan, 8,000 in Hawaii, and 66,000 in Southern California. We also began rotating approximately 250 Marines through Darwin, Australia since 2012 and expect the size of this rotational force to grow to 2,500 over the next few years as both of our governments see fit. Furthermore, we are in the process of discussion to put a number of Marines on Guam as many as possible eventually and the Secretary of Defense told that he would like to deploy 22,000 Marines forward-deployed west of the International Date Line to support our national strategy shift to the Pacific.

Q: How does the USMC envision the future battlefield and the evolving trends in modern warfare?

A: Historically, we've done a pretty lousy job of guessing what the next war will be or where it will take place so I'm not one for chasing after trends in modern warfare. What I learned from my 40 years carrier is that we must prepare for unexpected incidents. We need prepare for young officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and are improving our training and education. We are also working to support our Marines on future battlefields by making sound business decisions today with regard to modernization – specifically in our ground combat tactical vehicles, our aviation, our ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) platforms and our amphibious ships. Furthermore, the Marine Corps has also increased commitments to U.S. Cyber Command and Special Operations Command. It is a pretty exciting time to be a Marine and I feel good about that.

Q: How relevant is the Joint Operational Access or Air-Sea Battle concept to the USMC? What are the likely implications for the future of the USMC, especially in the Asia-Pacific?

A: The Marine Corps play an important role in Joint Operational Access and Air-Sea Battle and we are very interested in concepts and the arguments that surround them. First, as our expeditionary crisis response force, not only that fact that the Marine Corps is unique in our sister services, versatile, agile and hard-hitting – our nation's shock troops, we maintain a high state of readiness that can deploy to contingencies around the world at a moment's

notice, and provide a balanced force for naval campaigns and ground and air striking forces ready to suppress or contain international disturbances. Though the bottom line for the Marines is to assure access to the shore, we take great risk if we discount the capabilities to project our national power at the place and time of our choosing. It is sometimes likely that the Marine Corps would be forced to land to protect our citizens and intervene in dangerous situations. This ability to deploy where our nation is not welcomed underwrites the deterrent value of our military and gives options to decision makers. Today's amphibious operations allow strategic maneuverability that creates and exploits seams along defended coastlines. As the U.S. priorities its strategic focus on the Pacific, it is likely that we have a pretty bright future. For the Marines Corps, the Pacific is our historical backyard. Since the end of World War II, the sizable numbers of the marines have been there and continue to maintain a large presence there. More importantly, we have built up strong partnerships there with our allies and friends. I am sure that there are no forces more suited to the Asia-Pacific region than amphibious forces that are highly mobile, very versatile, and self-sustainable.

Refer to the article: The U.S. Marine Corps Surges to the Asia-Pacific

<http://thediplomat.com/2012/12/11/our-institutional-dna-the-u-s-marine-corps-surges-to-the-asia-pacific/>

### **December 18 “Chinese warships visited Sydney” (The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2012)**

On the 18th, a flotilla of Chinese warships composed by the *Yi Yang*, the *Chang Zhou* and the *Qian Dao Hu* visited Sydney in Australia with 4 days, returning from counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. According to the Australian Defense Minister, this visit is the largest one since its first military vessels to Australia 5 years ago.

Refer to the article: Sydney Hosts Rare Chinese Naval Visit

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324407504578186612449340362.html>

### **December 19 “the Indian Navy got its first long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft” (The Times of India, December 20, 2012)**

On the 19th December, the Indian Navy got its first P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft at the Boeing facility in Seattle, the U.S. Though the navy has concluded the contract to purchase 8 P-8I aircrafts for \$2.1 billion in 2009, after getting its second and third ones, that team will fly the three to India in May-June 2013. The rest of 5 will be delivered by 2015. Additionally, India is now negotiating to acquire of another 4 P-8I whose operating range is around 1,200 nautical miles and 9 medium-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, which with a range of 350 nautical miles. India which has a vast 5,422 km coastline, 1,197 islands and 2.01 million sq km of Exclusive Economic Zone is also acquiring of its naval air assets as well as warships to take care of its primary area of strategic interest stretching from Persian Gulf to Malacca Strait.

Refer to the article: Navy gets first long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft

[http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-20/india/35932539\\_1\\_p-8i-maritime-reconnaissance-aircraft-three-tier-maritime-surveillance-grid](http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-20/india/35932539_1_p-8i-maritime-reconnaissance-aircraft-three-tier-maritime-surveillance-grid)

### **December 21 “Russia postpones domestic construction of French landing ship” (The Voice of Russia, December 21, 2012)**

According to a report from *The Voice of Russia* dated the 21st, Russia’s Defense Ministry says that Russia does not reject from building its own helicopter carrier ships of the “*Mistral*” class, but is postponing this project from 2013 to 2016. The construction of the first “*Mistral*” ship for Russia started in France in late 2011. It is also planned to build another such ship for Russia in France. “We are postponing the construction of our own “*Mistrals*” because we need time to evaluate Russia’s possibilities for that, to determine what role these ships would play in Russia’s navy and to better learn how to use them,” the representative of Russia’s Defense Ministry said. According to earlier agreements, France was to build two such ships, with the costs totaling more than a billion Euros, while Russia was to build two more ships at its own shipyards. But, according to the periodical, the concept of using *Mistral* class ships by the Russian Navy has turned out to be questionable, while the building and maintenance costs, too heavy. France is already building two helicopter-carriers for Russia, with the first one due to be commissioned in 2014, while the second one, in 2015. Both naval ships will be based in Vladivostok.

Refer to the article: Russia postpones construction of its own “Mistrals”

[http://english.ruvr.ru/2012\\_12\\_21/Russia-postpones-construction-of-its-own-Mistrals/](http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_12_21/Russia-postpones-construction-of-its-own-Mistrals/)



Russia is postponing the project of building its own helicopter carrier ships of the “*Mistral*” class from 2013 to 2016.

Source: The Voice of Russia, December 21, 2012

### **December 31 “Singaporean submarine arrives from Sweden” (MINDF, Singapore, December 31, 2012)**

The Republic of Singapore Navy’s (RSN) second *Archer*-class submarine, RSS *Swordsman*, arrived at Changi Naval Base (CNB) from Sweden on the 31st. Launched in Karlskrona, Sweden, on October 20, 2010, RSS *Swordsman* is one of two ex-Royal Swedish Navy *Västergötland*-class

submarines that Singapore acquired in 2005. RSS *Swordsman* has been comprehensively upgraded, refurbished and tropicalised to ensure its suitability for operations in local conditions. The crew of RSS *Swordsman* has also undergone extensive training in Sweden since 2008. RSS *Archer* is the RSN's first *Archer*-class submarine.

Refer to the article: RSN's second Archer-class submarine back in S'pore

<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1245281/1/.html>



RSS *Swordsman* berthed at Changi Naval Base, at the homecoming ceremony on December 31, 2012.

Source: MINDEF, Singapore, December 31, 2012

### 3. South China Sea-related Events

#### December 3 “Vietnam protests cutting cable incident against Beijing” (The Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2012)

On the 3rd, the state-run Vietnam Oil & Gas Group (PetroVietnam) announced that two Chinese fishing vessels cut cables of the Vietnamese ship MV *Binh Minh 02* conducting a seismic survey on oil exploration. MV *Binh Minh 02* was conducting the survey 43 miles southeast of Con Co Island when the Chinese vessels ran across its cables and cut them on November 30. PetroVietnam said in a statement, “PetroVietnam strongly protests the violations of the Chinese fishing vessels and has requested the Vietnamese authorities to demand the Chinese side to educate their citizens to respect Vietnam’s maritime sovereignty.” According to the statement of PetroVietnam, it has repaired the cables and resumed seismic work on December 1. In May 2011, the Vietnamese government also accused Chinese vessels of harassing fishermen and cutting the cables of MV *Binh Minh 02*.

Refer to the article: Vietnam Accuses Chinese Ships

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323717004578157033857113510.html>





*MV Binh Minh 02*

Source: gCaptain, December 4, 2012

### **【Related article 1】**

#### **“China calls on Vietnam to halt oil and gas activity” (Rigzone.com, December 6, 2012)**

On the 6th, China demanded that Vietnam stop unilateral oil and gas activity in a naval area claimed by both nations. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said, “We cannot accept Vietnam’s statements. According to our initial understanding, the incident occurred between Vietnam and China’s Hainan island in overlapping sovereign waters of the two countries. The Chinese fishing vessels were engaged in ordinary fishing activities, and were unreasonably dispelled by Vietnamese navy ships. Vietnam should stop its unilateral oil and gas activities in this area, and stop interfering with Chinese ships.”

Refer to the article: China Warns Vietnam on Oil Exploration

[http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil\\_gas/a/122616/China\\_Warns\\_Vietnam\\_on\\_Oil\\_Exploration](http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/122616/China_Warns_Vietnam_on_Oil_Exploration)

### **【Relate article 2】**

#### **“Vietnamese experts’ comment: cutting cable incident and border demarcation in Gulf of Tonkin” (CSIS, Asia Policy Blog, December 14, 2012)**

Vietnamese experts on the South China Sea issue, Huy Duong and Van Pham showed points on the cutting cable incident in the blog of the American think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as follows.


- (1) This incident took place at 17°26’N, 108°02’E—roughly 43 nautical miles from Vietnam’s Con Co Island, 54 nautical miles from Vietnam’s mainland coast, and 75 miles from China’s Hainan Island (see the map below). It was 210 miles from the disputed Paracel Islands, and is therefore unrelated to the dispute over that archipelago. Although China and Vietnam agreed to a boundary between their waters inside the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000, the two countries are still negotiating a boundary for the area outside its entrance. If international law or international practice of maritime delimitation is applied, there is little doubt that the negotiated boundary will be at approximately equal distance from

China's Hainan Island and Vietnam's mainland coast and coastal islands. If the boundary were drawn in a way that is most favorable to Vietnam (i.e., halfway between Con Co Island and Hainan), then the location of this incident would be 13.5 nautical miles nearer to the Vietnamese mainland coast than this boundary. Conversely, if the boundary were drawn in a way that is most favorable to China (i.e., halfway between Vietnam's mainland coast and Hainan, disregarding Vietnam's Con Co Island), then the location of this incident would still be 10.5 nautical miles nearer to the Vietnamese mainland coast than this boundary. A reasonable compromise would be for the boundary to lie exactly between the two above-mentioned positions. The location of the cable-cutting incident is 12 nautical miles nearer to Vietnam than this compromise boundary.

- (2) Thus far, China has not indicated the basis for this claim, but it would be difficult to find a legal justification for why a maritime area 75 nautical miles from Hainan and 54 nautical miles from Vietnam's mainland coast should belong to China. It is apparent that China is seeking to treat an area that it cannot reasonably dispute as a disputed area, and there are three possible explanations for this. It might be China's negotiating tactic to claim far beyond all possible equidistance lines, so that when a compromise is reached it will still end up with a part of the area beyond those lines. The second hypothesis is that China does not accept the use of equidistance lines for drawing the boundary for this area. In pursuing its various claims around the "U-shaped line", China has been referring to "historic waters" and "historic rights". It is possible that China wishes to apply these arguments to the demarcation of this area. The third hypothesis is that China does not want to demarcate this area at all, preferring instead to "set aside the dispute and pursue joint development" even in an area where it does not have a reasonable claim.
- (3) Due to the asymmetry of power between the two countries, a negotiated boundary based on the use of equidistance lines, as per legal and international norms for the demarcation of similar areas, will best protect Vietnam's rights. Joint development might be a temporary solution or might operate in conjunction with this boundary, but cannot be a viable long term substitute for it. Unfortunately, this asymmetry also means that Vietnam's options might be limited should China choose one or a combination of the three above-mentioned scenarios.

Refer to the article: Trouble outside the Gulf of Tonkin

<http://cogitasia.com/trouble-outside-the-gulf-of-tonkin/>



### December 20 “ASEAN strengthens maritime security cooperation with India” (Reuters, December 20, 2012)

ASEAN and India reached an agreement to strengthen maritime security cooperation, “new strategic partnership”, at a summit in New Delhi on the 20th. In the vision statement, while the countries underlined the need for freedom of navigation, there were no references about China. Additionally, though Vietnam and the Philippines referred to tensions with China, India avoided doing it. The Indian Foreign Minister said that “issues of sovereignty “need to be resolved between the countries concerned” at a news conference. India, which it is not a party of the territorial disputes in South China Sea, is exploring for oil and gas with Vietnam in an area contested by China, and furthermore it is expected to ship liquefied natural gas from Russia through the Malacca Straits. The Indian navy chief said it is ready to dispatch its vessels to South China Sea, if necessary, to protect maritime interests and the President of Indonesia Yudhoyono emphasized that “accompanying the need to expand maritime security cooperation with India from the fact that 70 percent of the world’s traffic in petroleum products passes through the Indian Ocean from the Middle East to East Asia, while the center of world economy is shifting to eastward, the Indian and Pacific Oceans will be more important in providing a sea route for trade and commerce”. In this conference, while the existence of India was impressive, the trade cooperation between China and ASEAN is deeper than that of ASEAN-India and Ian Storey, senior fellow of the Institute of Southeast Studies in Singapore, said “India’s presence in Southeast Asia would provide ASEAN countries additional hedging options against China”.

Refer to the article: In China's shadow, ASEAN leaders look to India for maritime security  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/20/us-india-southeastasia-idUSBRE8BJ0Q220121220>

### **December 25 “China to make enormous investment in supporting infrastructure in South China Sea” (Taipei Times, December 26, 2012)**

On the 25th, China announced it will invest more than 10 billion yuan (US\$1.6 billion) to build infrastructure on disputed islands in the South China Sea and to strengthen marine law enforcement in the region. Citing Hainan Province Governor Jiang Dingzhi, the Guangzhou-based *21st Century Herald* reported that China would build an airport, piers and other important infrastructure on islands administered by Sansha, a prefecture-level city under Hainan’s jurisdiction that was created in July following approval by the State Council in June. Some of the construction has already begun, the paper said, without providing details. Located on Woody Island, the largest island in the Paracels and 350km southeast of Hainan, Sansha “administers” more than 200 islets, sandbanks and reefs and their surrounding waters in the Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank and the Paracel chains. The Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau of Hainan Province announced in September that the establishment of Sansha had caught the attention of investors. According to Chinese media, officials in Sansha have been evaluating various commercial development plans, including the establishment of a tax haven and casino resorts. According to *The 21st Century Herald*, Jiang added that in addition to supporting infrastructure, the funds would be used to acquire marine law enforcement vessels and supply ships. Under new rules which are to come into effect in January 2013, police in Hainan will have the authority to board and seize control of foreign ships that “illegally” enter Chinese waters. It remains unclear whether the directive only pertains to coastal areas near Hainan Island or to the entire body of water administered by Sansha.

Refer to the article: China to invest US\$1.6bn in disputed islands  
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/12/26/2003551011>



The city of Sansha in the Paracel Islands is seen from the air.


Source: Taipei Times, December 26, 2012

**December 27 “Taiwan to explore natural resources in South China Sea” (The China Post, December 28, 2012)**

The Taiwanese government will be dispatching vessels to explore oil and natural gas resources in the waters around Taiping Island in the South China Sea in 2013, economic officials said. On the 27th, Director-General Jerry Ou of the Energy Bureau under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) said the bureau has earmarked NT\$17 million to the MOEA’s Bureau of Mine to finance its plan. The Bureau of Mine will be responsible for carrying out the project. The official said Taiwan relies on imports for more than 98 percent of its energy, and therefore it is a top priority for the government to explore new energy sources around its territories. Her bureau will join hands with the state-run oil refiner CPC Corp., Taiwan to dispatch research teams to conduct tests and take samples on potential oil and gas reserves in waters around the island. The one-year project is expected to offer Taiwanese authorities a clearer picture of energy sources in the South China Sea. The 0.49-square-kilometer island lies about 1,600 kilometers southwest of Kaohsiung in Southern Taiwan. Taiping Island is the biggest island in the Spratly chain and is currently manned by more than 100 Coast Guard personnel from Taiwan.

Refer to the article: Gov’t to explore oil, gas in South China Sea next year: MOEA

<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2012/12/28/365488/Govt-to.htm>



Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island in English), which is the largest of the Spratly Islands. Photo SCMP

Source: South China Morning Post, September 1, 2012

## 4. Diplomacy and International Relations

### December 6 “India’s growing naval force changes the balance of power in the Pacific? –Indian Expert–“(Foreign Policy, December 6, 2012)

Dhruva Jaishankar, a fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, contributed an article titled “India’s Ocean: Could New Delhi’s growing naval force change the balance of power in the Pacific?” in *Foreign Policy* dated the 6th. According to his article, it is highly likely that India’s Navy maintains its permanent presence in the Pacific, accompanying with India’s growing economy, military technology and energy demand. The gist of his article is as follows.

- (1) Is the Indian Navy deciding to counter China on the high seas? For years, Indian strategists have concerned how China’s naval modernization influences their political and economic interests. In the book authored by C. Raja Mohan\*, one of India’s most influential strategic thinkers, it is estimated that a tension between U.S-China-India maritime relations will grow, in viewing the China-India dispute from Himalayan to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. India’s top admiral said that we are ready to defend Indo-Vietnamese oil exploration efforts in the South China Sea against Chinese aggression.
- (2) It is highly likely that India’s Navy maintains its permanent presence in the Pacific, accompanying with India’s growing economy, military technology and energy demand. Historically, the Indian Navy has been smallest and most poorly-resourced of India’s three military services. The navy has 60,000 active personnel and a \$7 billion annual budget, and roughly a quarter of the strength and resources of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. Its long-range capabilities come from a single aircraft carrier, a second-hand amphibious transport dock, 14 German- or Russian-designed diesel-powered submarines, and about 20 destroyers and frigates. Today this has the largest naval presence in the Indian Ocean after the U.S. Except for the both of China and the U.S, Japan and S. Korea and perhaps Taiwan boast comparable capacities for the region, although their navies are more narrowly focused. But the Indian Navy force is overwhelmingly larger than that of countries which have territorial disputes with China in South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines have just 3 active frigates. The temporary presence of even a small Indian squadron in the Pacific could make a meaningful difference to the region’s balance of power.
- (3) India is practicing sea trials of an indigenously-designed nuclear-powered submarine, which will significantly increase its navy’s operational range. In the next 2 years, the navy plans to get a second aircraft carrier and modern French submarines into active service. The navy’s share of the defense budget has steadily grown from less than 15 percent of India’s annual military expenditure in 2000 to 19 percent in 2012, outpacing India’s overall defense spending. Furthermore, the navy concluded an agreement to purchase P-8 I aircraft from the U.S. in 2009, and is able to work with other regional navies. Beginning with basic exercises in the early 2000s, the Indian Navy’s collaboration with the U.S. Pacific Command has evolved into complex war games. In 2004, India proved their ability

to deal with regional crises with the U.S., Japan, and Australia through humanitarian relief operations in Southeast Asia. And the Malabar series of naval exercises between India and the U.S., which include Japan, Australia and Singapore, strengthened the navy's ability to work closely partners. On the contrast, China's territorial disputes with ASEAN countries and Japan generate further suspicion of Chinese military intentions.

- (4) India's steadily strengthening naval capabilities and its deepening commercial engagements in the Pacific Rim means that India has evolved to provide security in the region to secure sea lines. This should be welcomed by not only the U.S, but also many countries which have economic interests in the region. For China, this can be a chance to improve the relation with India. But China needs to accept India's ability to play the role as a Pacific power.

Refer to the article: India's Ocean – Could New Delhi's growing naval force change the balance of power in the Pacific?

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/06/indias\\_ocean?page=full](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/06/indias_ocean?page=full)

Note: C. Raja Mohan, *Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.

### **December 14"China submitted an application for its Partial Submission Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in the East China Sea" (China Media.com, December 14, 2012)**

On the 14th December, China submitted an application for its Partial Submission Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the East China Sea to the UN Secretariat. From China's view, physiognomy and geological characteristics show that the continental shelf in the East China Sea is the natural prolongation of China's land territory and the natural prolongation of the continental shelf of China in the East China Sea extends to the Okinawa Trough.

Refer to the article: China reports to UN outer limits of continental shelf in East China Sea

<http://www.chinamedia.com/2012/12/14/china-reports-to-un-outer-limits-of-continental-shelf-in-east-china-sea/>

Note: On December 29, 2012, the Japanese Government submitted to the UN Secretariat a verbal note, in which the Japanese Government requested that the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) would not discuss China's submission.

### **December 15 "Sri Lanka, India and Maldives sign an agreement on maritime cooperation soon" (Hindu, December 15, 2012)**

According to the report from the Hindu dated on the 15th, Sri Lankan Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa said that Sri Lanka, Maldives and India will sign an agreement for trilateral maritime cooperation to deal with maritime surveillance, anti piracy operations and illegal activities including maritime pollution. A key aspect of information sharing is Maritime Domain Awareness. He continuously noted that Meetings have already been held at the Ministerial level

and at the technical level, and the Memorandum of Understanding with regard to the trilateral cooperation between our nations will be signed in the near future. I am confident that multilateral agreements of this nature will be greatly instrumental in curbing many of the issues that the naval powers in the region face. Other part, Indian Vice Chief of Naval Staff R.K. Dhowan pointed out that piracy emanating from Somalia has been confined to an area of 700 nautical miles from India's coasts and it is essential to strengthen the trilateral naval cooperation. Accompanied with those, India sent a Military Attache (MA) as a military officer in Maldives for the first time. Only five countries –India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and China have diplomatic posts in Maldives and all the other countries either operate out of Colombo or New Delhi.

Refer to the article: India, Sri Lanka, Maldives to sign agreement on maritime cooperation

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-sri-lanka-maldives-to-ink-trilateral-cooperation-on-maritime-issues/article4203041.ece>

### **【Related article】**

#### **“Hambantota is not China's pearl- the Defense Minister of Sri Lanka”(The Hindu, December 14, 2012)**

The Defense and Urban Development Secretary of Sri Lanka, Gotabaya Rajapaksa said that the Hambantota port is not part of a Chinese 'string of pearls' to surround India in the Galle Dialogue. The port is now in the time just after completing the first phase of construction and has not yet receiving as many ships as expected. Mr. Gotabaya noted that "Placing the Hambantota port within the paradigm of the 'string of pearls' theory is not correct...From Sri Lanka's perspective, I wish to clarify that the Chinese investment in the Hambantota port is a purely economic one" and added that "most of the larger companies setting up operations at the Hambantota port were actually Indian". Ports for China's strategy, which is called string of pearls, is thought to include Gwadar in Pakistan, Marao in Maldives, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar. Mr. Gotabaya who justifies these port constructions said that while it is natural from China's view to expand its economic influence accompanying with its rapid growth, it is understandable from India's view to regard China's expansive influence as an attempt to encircle India.

Refer to the article: Not in 'string of pearls': Sri Lanka

<http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-international/not-in-string-of-pearls-sri-lanka/article4198107.ece>





Hambantota port

Source: The Hindu, December 14, 2012

### **December 26 “S. Korea submitted its claim on East China shelf to U.N.” (Yonhap News, December 27, 2012)**

On the 26th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of South Korea said that South Korea submitted a formal claim to extend a portion of continental shelf beyond the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: CLCS, the U.N. The document South Korea submitted insists that the natural prolongation of the continental shelf of the Korean Peninsula in the East China Sea extends to the Okinawa Trough. The S. Korea official said that it is extended up to 125 kilometers toward Japan compared to our 2009 preliminary report, and the size of the shelf claimed by Seoul in its official document has more than doubled.

Refer to the article: S. Korea submits formal claim on East China Sea shelf to U.N.

[http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/12/26/96/0301000000AEN20121226009200315\\_F.HTML](http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/12/26/96/0301000000AEN20121226009200315_F.HTML)

## **5. Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors**

### **December 4 “TOTE Orders World’s First LNG-Powered Containerships” (gCaptain, December 4, 2012)**

On the 4th, General Dynamics NASSCO announced that they signed a historic contract with Totem Ocean Trailer Express, Inc. (TOTE) to construct two 3,100 TEU LNG-powered containerships for the first time in the world. The contract includes an additional option to construct further 3 containerships. Once completed, the 764-foot-long containerships are expected to be the biggest ships to be powered by LNG, and the first two ships will be designed by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) and constructed at Nassco Shipyard. Not only the

fact that the ships can operate on either fuel oil or gas delivered from LNG, these are adopting latest environmental technology such as ballast water treatment system. Construction of first containers is scheduled to be started in the first quarter of 2014 and delivered in the fourth quarter of 2015. The other is also scheduled to delivered in the first quarter of 2016 and these 2 containers will be operated between Jacksonville in Florida and San Juan in Puerto Rico.

Refer to the article: TOTE Orders World's First LNG-Powered Containerships

<http://gcaptain.com/tote-inks-deal-to-build-worlds-first-lng-powered-containerships/>



An artist's rendering of new TOTE ships. Image: General Dynamics NASSCO

Source: gCaptain, December 4, 2012

### **December 15 “Abu Dhabi opens new port” (Gulf Base, December 15, 2012)**

On the 15th, the Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC) has officially opened the Khalifa Port. The UAE's diversification of economy away from dependence on oil was given a huge boost with this inauguration, which serves to kick start global awareness of Kizad, the vast new industrial zone adjacent to Khalifa Port. Within a generation, Khalifa Port and Kizad are set to account for up to 15 per cent of Abu Dhabi's non-oil GDP, creating hundreds of new jobs and critical skills aligned to the Emirate's future economic plans. The completion of the first phase of the new port – whose container terminal began commercial operations on September 1 – will give it the capacity to handle 50,000 containers a week and one million tons of cargo every month. Yet all freight movements are controlled by just a small team of skilled operatives based in a state-of-the-art control centre, setting a new global benchmark in port technology.

Refer to the article: Abu Dhabi opens \$7.2bn Khalifa Port

<http://www.gulfbase.com/news/abu-dhabi-opens-7-2bn-khalifa-port/223425>



## **Ocean Policy Research Foundation**

Toranomon 35 Mori Bldg., 4-10 Toranomom 3-Chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0001, Japan  
TEL.81-3-5404-6828 FAX.81-3-5404-6800

The "Ship & Ocean Foundation" is operating under the name of "Ocean Policy Research Foundation"